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Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Link Between Illicit 
Opium Production and Security in Afghanistan 
Elizabeth Peterson*  
Since 2001, the United States and its allies have invested billions 
of dollars in rebuilding a democratic Afghanistan.1 Their efforts have 
been stymied by the increased production of opium. In 2006, 165,000 
hectares of land in Afghanistan were used to cultivate opium poppy.2 
Afghanistan’s total potential opium production in 2006 alone was 
6100 metric tons,3 92% of the global supply of illicit opium.4  
The opium situation has been particularly bad in Afghanistan’s 
southern provinces.5 A district chief in the Helmand province6 
explained: “Of course we’re growing poppy this year. The 
government, the foreigners—they promised us help if we stopped. 
But where is it?”7 A smuggler from Kandahar8 said: “Whatever I am, 
 
 * J.D. (2007), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; M.A. (2004), Uppsala 
University; A.B. (2003), Brown University. 
 1. CIA, The World Fact Book: Afghanistan (May 7, 2007), http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/index.html (last visited May 7, 2007) (the international community has 
pledged over $24 billion to Afghanistan since 2002).  
 2. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, AFGHANISTAN OPIUM WINTER 
RAPID ASSESSMENT SURVEY 8 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/ 
2007_ORAS.pdf [hereinafter UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY].  
 3. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, AFGHANISTAN: OPIUM SURVEY 
2006 6 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG05%20_full_web_ 
2006.pdf [hereinafter UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY].  
 4. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6; Antonio Maria Costa, Preface to 
UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at iii (Afghanistan has “the dubious distinction 
of having nearly a monopoly of the world heroin market.”). 
 5. UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 8 (cultivation in the five southern 
provinces—Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Day kundi—increased by 121% between 
2005 and 2006, from 46,147 hectares to 101,900 hectares).  
 6. 42% of Afghanistan’s 2006 opium crop was produced in Hilmand. UNODC 
FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 40.  
 7. Andrew North, Losing the War on Afghan Drugs, BBC NEWS, May 18, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4493596.stm.  
 8. Kandahar yielded approximately 7.5% of the Afghan opium crop in 2006. UNODC 
FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 40. 
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I am not killing people, I am not looting people, I am not doing any 
other kind of illegal job . . . I belong to a family who live within the 
limits of Islam.”9 At the same time, people in communities that have 
not grown opium poppies have become quite frustrated. In Asad 
Khyl, a village leader lamented: “We never grew poppies, we never 
courted the Taliban, we lived by the law and our minds and lives 
were burnt by the war. Still, the international community just keeps 
giving money to poppy growers and criminals to win them over.”10 
The situation was described very succinctly, and rather 
pessimistically, by a farmer in Helmand: “We don’t have law. This is 
a warlord kingdom.”11 
The opium situation in Afghanistan is bleak, but it is not 
completely hopeless. Some progress is being made in the war against 
drugs in Afghanistan, but this progress is fragile. This Note will set 
out why Afghanistan is susceptible to the proliferation of narcotics, 
how this vulnerability affects Afghanistan and the rest of the world, 
and what the United States can do to help the Afghan Government 
eradicate opium production within its borders.  
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of major events in 
the last century of Afghan history in an attempt to explain why 
Afghanistan is prone to conflict and widespread illegal activity. Part 
II will describe the current shape of opium production in Afghanistan 
and how this affects other states. Part III will discuss efforts that the 
Afghan Government and the international community have made to 
curb opium production. Part IV will analyze some of the current tools 
available to eradicate opium production. This Note will conclude that 
the United States can assist Afghanistan effectively in its fight to 
eliminate opium production.  
 
 9. Tom Coghlan, Meeting an Afghan Drugs Smuggler, BBC NEWS, May 18, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4522957.stm.  
 10. Soutik Biswas, Afghan Village Mirrors National Plight, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4244454.stm. For a further discussion of the extreme 
poverty in Afghanistan, see infra note 59. 
 11. David Rohde, Losing “Little America”: Afghanistan, 5 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 15336511.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/11
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS OF AFGHAN 
HISTORY 
Afghanistan is located at “the crossroads of Asia”12 and was 
occupied by one foreign power after another after the rise of 
Zoroastrianism in the seventh century BCE.13 Afghanistan became a 
fully independent state in 1919 and Amir Amanullah became its 
king.14 Afghanistan adopted its first liberal constitution under King 
Zahir in 1964.15 King Zahir’s cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud, 
seized power in a military coup in 1973, and was killed in a 
subsequent coup by the communist People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) on April 27, 1978.16  
The PDPA “brutally imposed a Marxist-style ‘reform’ program, 
which ran counter to deeply rooted Afghan traditions.”17 A revolt 
began in eastern Afghanistan during the summer of 1978 and spread 
across the country.18 The PDPA responded by “inviting” the Soviets 
 
 12. NIKLAS L.P. SWANSTRÖM & SVANTE E. CORNELL, A STRATEGIC CONFLICT 
ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN 1 (2005), available at http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/ 
publications/2005/050820AFGHAN.pdf. 
 13. LARRY P. GOODSON, AFGHANISTAN’S ENDLESS WAR: STATE FAILURE, REGIONAL 
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN 24 (2001). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Afghanistan served as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires in what has 
come to be known as the “Great Game.” Id. at 32. The “Great Game” was taken from 
RUDYARD KIPLING, KIM (1919). GOODSON, supra note 13, at 27. 
 14. GOODSON, supra note 13, at 36. King Amanullah introduced a number of secularizing 
reforms in the 1920s. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN (Dec. 
2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm [hereinafter STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND 
NOTE]. These reforms included the “abolition of the traditional Muslim veil for women and the 
opening of a number of co-educational schools.” Id. 
 King Amanullah abdicated in 1929, and was eventually replaced by Nadir Khan, who ruled 
until 1933. Id. Prince Nadir was succeeded by his son, Zahir Shah, who ruled from 1933 until 
1973. Id. 
 15. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE: CHALLENGES 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES, NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 94 (2005), available at 
http://www.undp.org/dpa/nhdr/af-files/afnhdr2004-complete.pdf [hereinafter UNDP, SECURITY 
WITH A HUMAN FACE]. This constitution was used as the basis for the Bonn Agreement of Dec. 
5, 2001. See infra note 48. 
 16. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 15, at 94.  
 17. STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14 (“Decrees forcing changes in 
marriage customs and pushing through an ill-conceived land reform were particularly 
misunderstood by virtually all Afghans. . . [and] thousands of members of the traditional elite, 
the religious establishment, and the intelligentsia were imprisoned, tortured, or murdered.”). See 
also GOODSON, supra note 13, at 55–56. 
 18. GOODSON, supra note 13, at 56–57. 
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to Afghanistan in 1979.19 The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 
December 25, 1979, and occupied until February 1989.20 
The Soviets faced an “increasingly strong Mujahideen resistance 
in response to the invasion.”21 This resistance movement grew 
because the invasion served as a rallying point for Islamic extremists 
in the 1980s.22 The resistance movement also received “substantial 
international assistance.”23 
Ultimately, the Soviet invasion inflicted tremendous damage on 
Afghan society: at least one million Afghanis were killed24 and 
millions became refuges.25 The social structure was altered as well, as 
 
 19. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 94. See also GOODSON, 
supra note 13, at 58. 
 20. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 95. For a detailed account 
of the Soviet occupation, see, e.g., GOODSON, supra note 13, at 55–69.  
 21. SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 2. See also AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN 208 
(2001) (“The Afghan Mujaheddin contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union, the Soviet 
empire and even communism itself.”). 
 22. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., 9/11 COMM’N REPORT 55 
(2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [hereinafter 9/11 
COMM’N REPORT] (“Young Muslims from around the world flocked to Afghanistan to join as 
volunteers in what was seen as a ‘holy war’—jihad—against an invader. The largest numbers 
came from the Middle East. Some were Saudis, and among them was Usama Bin Ladin.”). See 
also infra note 36.  
 23. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 95. One report says the 
United States gave $3 billion in “military and economic assistance to Afghans and the 
resistance movement.” STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14. Another source 
indicates that the United States spent between four and five billion dollars in Afghanistan 
between 1980 and 1992. RASHID, supra note 21, at 18. Additionally, “US funds were matched 
by Saudi Arabia and together with support from other European and Islamic countries, the 
Mujaheddin received a total of over US$10 billion. Most of this aid was in the form of lethal 
modern weaponry given to a simple agricultural people who used it with devastating results.” 
Id. (footnote omitted).  
 Alfred W. McCoy described U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation 
as “covert warfare” and “a desperate response to a crisis that threatened the U.S. position in a 
strategic theater that arched from Saudi Arabia to India.” ALFRED W. MCCOY, THE POLITICS OF 
HEROIN: CIA COMPLICITY IN THE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE 472 (2d rev. ed. 2003). For further 
discussion of this point, see id. at 470–78. 
 24. STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14. Another report indicates that 1.5 to 
2 million Afghanis were killed, with an equal number maimed or wounded. SWANSTRÖM & 
CORNELL, supra note 12, at 2. 
 25. The UNDP reported that three million Afghans fled to refugee camps in Pakistan and 
two million went to Iran. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 95. 
Another report estimates that six million Afghanis became refugees, and several million more 
“were forced into internal displacement.” SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 2.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/11










2007]  Illicit Opium Production and Security 219 
 
 
the radical Mujahideen gained power.26 The Soviet invasion also 
devastated Afghanistan’s infrastructure.27 
The Soviet occupation was followed by a period of high intensity 
civil war, lasting approximately from 1989 to 1992.28 The Afghan 
state had seriously disintegrated by the early 1990s.29 This gave way 
to the rise of the Taliban regime in the mid-1990s.30 
The Taliban was comprised of former Afghan refugees who were 
indoctrinated with very conservative values in madrassas in 
Pakistan.31 The Taliban “enjoyed the financial and military support of 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, and were also 
welcomed by the majority of the Afghan population, which was 
traumatized by the behaviour of local Mujahideen fighters.”32 The 
Taliban imposed a strict interpretation of the Sharia law which 
adversely “affected the lives of urban women and girls who had to 
wear the all enveloping chaddari, and who were forbidden to attend 
schools or university, to work, or to leave their homes without a male 
relative.”33 The Taliban also “committed serious atrocities against 
minority populations, particularly the Shi’a Hazara ethnic group, and 
killed noncombatants in several well-documented instances.”34  
 
 26. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 95 (“Authority increasingly 
came from local Mujahideen militia commanders, whose newly acquired wealth and power was 
bolstered by an aid-arms industry.”). The Mujahideen “fell into increasingly vicious in-fighting 
in the early 1990s, effectively leading to the collapse of the Afghan state, which was capitalized 
upon by the emergent Taliban movement to grab power in the mid-1990s. . . .” SWANSTRÖM & 
CORNELL, supra note 12, at 2. 
 27. SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 2. 
 28. GOODSON, supra note 13, at 70–73. 
 29. SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 3 (Afghanistan was “conquered 
successively by various armed factions that exercised little or no responsible control even over 
the use of force or law and order, let alone any economic and social functions of the state.”). 
 30. GOODSON, supra note 13, at 73–81. The Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996. See 
generally RASHID, supra note 21, at 17–54 (describing the rise of the Taliban regime in great 
detail); UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 95; STATE DEP’T, 
BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14. 
 31. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 95; RASHID, supra note 21, 
at 23. 
 32. UNDP, SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 16, at 95. 
 33. Id. at 96. For more information about women’s lives under the Taliban, see, e.g., 
RASHID, supra note 21, at 105–16.  
 34. STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14. The Hazara people are the largest 
Shia Muslim group in Afghanistan, they live in the center of the country, and comprise 
approximately ten percent of the Afghan population. GOODSON, supra note 13, at 16. In 1998, 
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The Taliban had very close ties with the terrorist organization Al 
Qaeda from 1996 until 2001.35 Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Ladin, 
had a close relationship with Taliban leader Mullah Omar.36 The 
Taliban supported Al Qaeda by allowing its members to “travel freely 
within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any immigration 
procedures, purchase and import vehicles and weapons, and enjoy the 
use of official Afghan Ministry of Defense license plates.”37 In effect, 
the Taliban provided Al Qaeda “a sanctuary in which to train and 
indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with 
other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes.”38 
Al Qaeda set up camps in Afghanistan which trained 10,000 to 
20,000 fighters.39  
Al Qaeda was responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam on August 7, 199840 and the attacks on 
the United States on September 11, 2001, in which almost 3000 
people were killed.41 The U.N. was very wary of the Taliban’s 
connection to Al Qaeda prior to 2001,42 and it condemned the attacks 
of September 11, 2001.43 
 
“the Taliban increased their pressure on the Hazara population by restricting the supply of food 
aid to the starving people of central Afghanistan.” Id. at 79.  
 Rashid explains the consequences of the Taliban’s actions: “The civil war . . . divided 
Islamic sects and ethnic groups in a way that before was unimaginable to ordinary Afghans. . . . 
[T]he Taliban massacres of Hazaras and Uzbeks in 1998 ha[d] no precedent in Afghan history 
and perhaps ha[ve] irreparably damaged the fabric of the country’s national and religious soul. 
The Taliban’s deliberate anti-Shia programme has denigrated Islam and the unity of the country 
as minority groups tried to flee the country en masse.” RASHID, supra note 21, at 83. 
 35. 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 22, at 63–67.  
 36. Id. at 66. For more information about Mullah Omar, see RASHID, supra note 21, at 
131–40.  
 37. 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 22, at 66.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 67.  
 40. STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14. These attacks killed 220 people 
and “made Bin Laden a household name in the Muslim world and the West.” RASHID, supra 
note 21, at 134. 
 41. For a detailed account of the attacks, see generally 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 
22.  
 42. The Security Council expressed its disapproval of the Taliban in a number of 
resolutions. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (indicted Osama 
bin Laden as a terrorist and called upon states to sanction the Taliban); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (noting that the Taliban benefited from the sale of opium and 
called upon states to freeze funds related to the Taliban). 
 43. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). The U.N. noted the link 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/11
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The United States and its allies reacted swiftly to the September 
11 attacks. They commenced a military campaign against 
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.44 The U.N. established the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on December 21, 
2001.45 The U.N. also established the U.N. Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA),46 whose mandates have emphasized the link 
 
between terrorism and narcotics. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) 
(listed anti-terrorism measures that should be taken by the international community). Also, the 
Security Council Note[ed] with concern the close connection between international terrorism 
and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and 
illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials. And in 
this regard, the Security Council emphasize[d] the need to enhance coordination of efforts on 
national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response 
to this serious challenge and threat to international security. S.C. Res. 1368 ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). The U.N. also condemned the Taliban. S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001) (condemns the Taliban and “[e]xpresses its strong support for the 
efforts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional administration leading to the 
formation of a government, both of which . . . should respect Afghanistan’s international 
obligations, including by cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit 
drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan” S.C. Res. 1378, supra at ¶ 1). 
 44. This campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom, was a response to “the Taliban’s 
repeated refusal to expel bin Laden and his group and end its support for international 
terrorism. . . . [And it] target[ed] terrorist facilities and various Taliban military and political 
assets within Afghanistan. Under pressure from U.S. military and anti-Taliban forces, the 
Taliban disintegrated rapidly, and Kabul fell on November 13, 2001.” STATE DEP’T, 
BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14.  
 45. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) (established ISAF with a six 
month mandate). ISAF is managed by NATO. For more information about ISAF, see 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Homepage, http://www.nato.int/isaf/ (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2007). The Security Council has extended ISAF’s mandate. S.C. Res. 1413, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1413 (May 23, 2002); S.C. Res. 1444, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1444 (Nov. 27, 
2002); S.C. Res. 1510, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (Oct. 13, 2003); S.C. Res. 1563, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1563 (Sept. 17, 2004); S.C. Res. 1623, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1623 (Sept. 13, 2005); S.C. 
Res. 1659, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1659 (Feb. 15, 2006); S.C. Res. 1707, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1707 
(Sept. 12, 2006). See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pressing Allies, President Warns of Afghan 
Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at A1. Currently, NATO has about 35,000 troops in 
Afghanistan, about 13,000 of them American. The United States has 9000 more troops in 
Afghanistan operating outside the NATO mission, handling tasks like specialized 
counterterrorism work and helping to train Afghan forces. Gen. David J. Richards of Britain, 
the outgoing NATO commander in Afghanistan, said [in July 2006] that NATO was 4000 to 
5000 troops short. Id. See also The Army in Afghanistan: A Thin Green Line, ECONOMIST, Aug. 
19, 2006, at 50 (A “central weakness” in the overall mission is that “[t]he NATO force has no 
reserves to reinforce troops in the most violent bits of its beat—despite its military chiefs 
having requested around 1,000 well-equipped troops to carry out this crucial role.”).  
 46. S.C. Res. 1401, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1401 (Mar. 28, 2002) (established the U.N. 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with a twelve month mandate). For more 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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between eradicating illicit narcotics production and democratic 
development.47  
The Afghan people have also tried to establish a new government. 
On December 5, 2001, representatives from various Afghan tribes 
signed the Bonn Agreement, which set up an interim government and 
called for both an Emergency Loya Jirga and a Constitutional Loya 
Jirga.48 The U.N. Security Council endorsed the Bonn Agreement.49  
Afghanistan has also reached agreements with its neighbors to 
“defeat terrorism, extremism, and narco-trafficking”50 and foster 
economic cooperation.51 Pursuant to the Bonn Agreement, the 
Afghan Interim Authority was created, and it drafted and ratified a 
constitution on January 3, 2004.52 Hamid Karzai was elected in the 
 
information, see The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, http://www.unama-
afg.org/. 
 47. The UNAMA homepage is http://www.unama-afg.org/. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1471, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1471 (Mar. 28, 2003) (extended the UNAMA mandate and included 
countering narcotics as one of the mission’s goals); S.C. Res. 1536, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1536 
(Mar. 26, 2004) ([T]ackling the drugs trade cannot be separated from creating a strong economy 
and a secure environment in Afghanistan and cannot be achieved without increased cooperation 
among neighbouring states and countries along trafficking routes to strengthen anti-narcotic 
controls to curb the drug flow.”); S.C. Res. 1589, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1589 (Mar. 24, 2005) 
(acknowledged the Afghan government’s efforts to implement its national drug control strategy, 
encouraged international cooperation in countering narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan, and 
“welcome[d] in this context the signing on 1 April 2004 of the Berlin Declaration on Counter-
Narcotics within the framework of the Kabul Declaration on Good-neighborly Relations of 22 
December 2002 . . . .”); S.C. Res. 1662, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1662 (Mar. 23, 2006). 
 48. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www. 
unama-afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn. 
htm [hereinafter Bonn Agreement]. 
 49. S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001).  
 50. Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations (Dec. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Kabul%20Declaration%20on%20Good%20Neighbourly%20
Relation%202002.pdf.  
 51. Kabul Declaration on Regional Economic Cooperation (Dec. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/RECC%20Dec%2005%20Kabul%20Declaration.pdf. 
 52. Hamid Karzai was Chairman of the interim Afghan government, which “held power 
for approximately 6 months while preparing for a nationwide ‘Loya Jirga’ (Grand Council) in 
mid-June 2002 that decided on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional 
Authority, headed by President Hamid Karzai, renamed the government as the Transitional 
Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA).” STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14. 
 TISA drafted the Afghan Constitution. See AFG. CONST., available at http://www.unama 
afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Loya-Jirga/CLJ/Translation%20of%20the%20Constitution%2
0May%2030.doc, which was approved by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004. 
STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/11
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first national democratic election on October 9, 2004.53 Parliamentary 
elections were held on September 18, 2005.54 
In spite of these achievements, Afghanistan is still a long way 
away from domestic tranquility.55 Warlords still wield a great deal of 
power throughout the countryside,56 Taliban insurgents continue to 
threaten the new state,57 political corruption is prevalent,58 poverty is 
 
 53. STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 14. More than 8 million Afghans 
voted, 41% of whom were women. Hamid Karzai was announced as the official winner on 
November 3 and inaugurated on December 7 for a five-year term as Afghanistan’s first 
democratically elected president. On December 23, 2004, President Karzai announced new 
cabinet appointments, naming three women as ministers. Id.  
 54. An election was held on September 18, 2005 for the “Wolesi Jirga” (lower house) of 
Afghanistan’s new bicameral National Assembly and for the country’s 34 provincial councils. 
Turnout for the election was about 53% of the 12.5 million registered voters. The Afghan 
constitution provides for indirect election of the National Assembly’s “Meshrano Jirga” (upper 
house) by the provincial councils and by reserved presidential appointments. The first 
democratically elected National Assembly since 1969 was inaugurated on December 19, 2005. 
Id. 
 55. Swanström and Cornell commend the democratic development in Afghanistan: “A 
genuine process of political change that is inclusive of the population and encourages 
participation is emerging. . . . Afghanistan has not seen a relapse to war, and war-weariness 
among the population may indeed be an important factor of stability in the country.” 
SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 3. All is not well, however, as low intensity 
conflicts between the government and “Taliban remnants” remain quite frequent. Id.  
 56. See, e.g., DEEPA OLLAPALY, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN 
AFGHANISTAN: WARLORDISM, RECONSTRUCTION, AND ETHNIC HARMONY (Apr. 2003), 
available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr105.pdf. Low intensity fighting has also 
threatened stability. Afghanistan: It’s Rough Up North, ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 2006, at 41 (“The 
feuding in the north has exasperated the government, which feels threatened by the mayhem in 
the south, and is increasingly composed of Pushtuns, the biggest group.”). 
 57. Carlotta Gall, NATO Mounts Largest Attack on Taliban in the South, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2007, at A8 (“Waziristan, in Pakistan’s tribal areas, has since 2001 become a base for 
Taliban and foreign fighters who have been accused of training and sending insurgents and 
suicide bombers into Afghanistan.”). See also U.S. to Press NATO for Help in Afghanistan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at A6 (Afghanistan’s “lawless border regions with Pakistan are the 
major breeding ground for international terrorism. . . . About 4,000 people were killed in the 
insurgency last year, and American officials say suicide attacks have increased fourfold since 
2005.”); Afghanistan: In Meltdown, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 14. 
 58. One smuggler told the BBC “there was little to fear while so many officials within the 
government and police were profiting from the drugs trade.” Coghlan, supra note 9. See also 
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2005, http://www.transparency.org/ 
policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (last visited Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter CPI 
2005] (Afghanistan ranked 117 on the CPI 2005). Afghanistan was not included in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index of 2006. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2006, http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/ surveys_indices/cpi/2006 (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter CPI 2006]. 
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rampant across the country,59 and the country’s infrastructure remains 
in disarray.60 Further, millions of landmines have rendered large 
tracts of Afghanistan deadly.61 
 
 Afghanistan’s anti-corruption chief, Izzatullah Wasifi, was arrested in Las Vegas in 1987 
for selling twenty-three ounces of heroin that had a street value of $2 million. Afghan 
Anticorruption Chief Sold Heroin in Las Vegas in ‘87, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2007, at A6. 
Wasifi served three years and eight months in prison. Id. However, in Wasifi’s defense, opium 
production dropped by 25% in the Farah province during his fourteen-month term as governor 
there. Id. Additionally, Afghan anti-narcotics officials say “there is no evidence to prove that 
Mr. Wasifi is involved in Afghanistan’s heroin trade.” Id.  
 59. The GDP per capita was $800 in 2004. CIA, The World Fact Book: Afghanistan, 
supra note 1. By contrast, the GDP per capita in the United States was $43,500 in 2006. CIA, 
The World Fact Book: United States (Mar. 15, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).  
 60. Rohde, supra note 11 (“When officials arrived in Kabul in late 2001, they were 
shocked by the country’s decrepit state. They had to build headquarters from scratch . . . and 
contend with the lack of skilled Afghan workers. For remote areas like Hilmand, it meant what 
assistance was available flowed in slowly.”).  
 Transportation networks that were destroyed during the Soviet invasion and the years of 
strife that followed are slowly being built up again. The United States helped Afghanistan build 
a highway connecting Kabul and Kandahar in the 1960’s. STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, 
supra note 14. “More than 35% of the country’s population lives within 50 kilometers of this 
highway, called, appropriately, modern Afghanistan’s lifeline” Id. This highway was largely 
destroyed after 1979, and by 2001, “[l]ittle could move along the lifeline that had provided so 
many Afghans with their means of livelihood and their access to healthcare, education, markets, 
and places of worship.” Id.  
 President Hamid Karzai is committed to restoring the highway, which will spur economic 
development. Id. Moreover, “[t]he restored highway is a visually impressive achievement 
whose symbolic importance should not be underestimated.” Id. The United States and Japan 
recently finished reconstructing the highway between Kabul and Kandahar, and will soon 
expand the road to Heart. Id. The Asian Development Bank is rebuilding another road between 
Kandahar and Spin Boldak, which is on the Pakistani border. Id. 
 Afghanistan does not have any functioning railways. Id. However, its national airline, 
Ariana, has domestic and international flights, and Kam Air, a private carrier, has domestic 
flights. Id. 
 The U.S. government also plans to spend millions of dollars repairing the Kajaki Dam in 
Hilmand. Gall, supra note 57. This dam “supplies electricity and irrigation to much of the 
southern region. Progress has been delayed because Taliban attacks have prevented engineers 
from working there or transporting equipment to the dam.” Id.  
 61. SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 2; STATE DEP’T, BACKGROUND NOTE, 
supra note 14 (“Afghanistan is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world; mine-
related injuries number up to 100 per month, and an estimated 200,000 Afghans have been 
disabled by landmine/unexploded ordinances (UXO) accidents.”).  
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II. AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION TODAY 
A. The Prevalence of Opium Production Within Afghanistan  
Afghanistan produced 92% of the global supply of illicit opium in 
2006.62 Consequently, Afghan heroin kills approximately 100,000 
people worldwide each year.63 Opium poppy has been cultivated in 
Afghanistan for centuries, but this massive volume is a modern 
phenomenon.64 The expansion of Afghanistan’s opium production 
has been attributed to increases in poppy cultivation and the growth 
of domestic heroin processing.65 Until approximately ten years ago, 
“Afghanistan mainly produced raw opium or morphine base, which 
was refined into heroin in Pakistan, southeastern Turkey, or the 
Balkans. Today, the overwhelming majority of heroin processing 
takes place inside Afghanistan.”66  
The expansion of opium production was largely ignored by the 
United States during the cold war.67 After the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, the United States began to pressure Pakistan to cut 
opium production.68 Meanwhile, the Taliban encouraged opium 
production in Afghanistan to generate revenue.69 The Taliban 
 
 62. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6. See supra notes 2–4 and 
accompanying text. 
 63. UNODC, THE OPIUM SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 7 (Aug. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan_2005/opium-afghanistan_2005-08-26.pdf [hereinafter 
UNODC, OPIUM SITUATION IN AUGUST 2005].  
 64. Svante E. Cornell, Stemming the Contagion: Regional Efforts to Curb Afghan 
Heroin’s Impact, 6 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 23 (2005) (Iran and Pakistan used to be the world’s 
primary opium producers, but hardly any opium is produced in those countries today.); RASHID, 
supra note 21, at 120 (“Pakistan had become a major opium producer during the 1980s 
producing around 800 metric tonnes a year or 70 per cent of the world’s supply of heroin until 
1989.”). 
 65. Cornell, supra note 64. 
 66. Id. at 24. 
 67. RASHID, supra note 21, at 121 (“The heroin pipeline in the 1980s could not have 
operated without the knowledge, if not connivance, of officials at the highest level of the [U.S.] 
army, the government and the CIA. Everyone chose to ignore it for the larger task was to defeat 
the Soviet Union.”). For a detailed account of U.S. policy toward Afghan opium produced in 
the 1970s and 1980s, see MCCOY, supra note 23, at 461–66, 470–78. 
 68. RASHID, supra note 21, at 122 (“Over the following decade (1989–99) some US$100 
million dollars of Western aid to combat narcotics was made available to Pakistan. Poppy 
cultivation was drastically reduced from a high of 800 tons to 24 tons in 1997 and two tons by 
1999.”).  
 69. RASHID, supra note 21, at 118. Rashid explains:  
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ultimately tried to use their control over Afghanistan’s opium 
production as a bargaining chip with the UN.70 In 2001, the Taliban’s 
ban on opium production was largely successful.71 Since 2001, 
however, opium production has been on the rise in Afghanistan.72 
In 2006, 165,000 hectares of land in Afghanistan were used to 
cultivate opium poppy.73 This is a 59% increase from 2005, when 
104,000 hectares were cultivated.74 The UNODC attributes much of 
the increase in Afghan cultivation to large-scale opium production in 
southern Afghanistan.75 Specifically, 42% of the opium cultivated in 
Afghanistan in 2006 came from the Helmand province.76 The total 
 
When [the Taliban] first captured Kandahar they had declared they would eliminate all 
drugs and US diplomats were encouraged enough by the announcement to make 
immediate contact with the Taliban. However, within a few months the Taliban 
realized that they needed the income from poppies and would anger farmers by 
banning it. They began to collect an Islamic tax called zakat on all dealers moving 
opium. According to the Koran, Muslims should give 2.5 per cent of their disposable 
income as zakat to the poor, but the Taliban had no religious qualms in collecting 20 
per cent of the value of a truckload of opium as zakat. 
Id. See also id. at 117–27; MCCOY, supra note 23, at 508. To raise revenues estimated at $20 to 
$25 million in 1997, the Taliban collected a 5 to 10% tax in kind on all opium harvested, a 
share that they then sold to laboratories; a flat tax of about $70 per kilogram on heroin refiners; 
and a transport tax of $250 on every kilogram exported. Id. (footnote omitted). Interestingly, 
during this time, the Taliban enforced its ban on hashish because, according to the regime’s 
anti-drug leader, hashish “is consumed by Afghans, Muslims. . . . Opium is permissible because 
it is consumed by kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans.” Id.  
 70. MCCOY, supra note 23, at 509; RASHID, supra note 21, at 123–24.  
 71. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 3, 6 (the 2001 opium crop was 
8000 hectares, and amounted to 185 metric tons).  
 72. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 3, 6 (lists annual opium production 
in terms from hectares and tons from 1994 to 2006). The only exception to this trend occurred 
in 2005. Id. 
 73. UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 8.  
 74. Id. The increase of opium cultivation in Afghanistan caused the global level of opium 
cultivation to increase by 33% to 201,900 hectares. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra 
note 3, at 3.  
 75. UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 8 (compares increases in levels of 
opium cultivation by province and region). See supra note 6; see also UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 
SURVEY, supra note 2, at 26–45 (provides data about opium cultivation in each province).  
 76. Id. Farmers in Hilmand cultivated 69,324 hectares of opium in 2006. Id. This 
constitutes a 162% increase in production over 2005, when 26,500 hectares were cultivated in 
the province. Id. at 8. There was no eradication reported, the security situation was “poor,” the 
dry opium price was 144 USD per kilogram. Id. All of the villages in Helmand surveyed by the 
UNODC reported opium poppy cultivation, id. at 41, and the UNODC projected that opium 
cultivation would increase in the 2006–2007 season. Id. at 40. For additional information about 
the situation Hilmand, see, e.g., Rohde, supra note 11 (“Helmand’s descent symbolizes how 
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potential opium production in 2006 was 6100 metric tons.77 The large 
volume of opium cultivation has been attributed to factors such as the 
high sale price of opium poppy and the need to alleviate poverty.78  
Opium prices dropped slightly in 2006, but remained high.79 The 
2006 prices were lower than opium prices in the period between 2001 
and 2003, but three times higher than the prices between 1994 and 
2000.80 At the same time, the farm-gate value of the 2006 opium 
harvest increased by 34% to $755 million.81 The estimated value of 
Afghanistan’s potential 2006 opium harvest reached approximately 
$3.1 billion, a 15% increase over 2005.82 The total amount of money 
 
Afghanistan has evolved since the initial victory over the Taliban into one of the most troubled 
fronts in the fight against terrorism.”).  
 77. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6. This reflects a 49% increase 
from 2005, when 4100 metric tons of opium was produced. Id. at 6. “This is the highest 
production level ever recorded in Afghanistan. As a consequence, global opium production has 
also reached its highest point since 1990, at 6,629 metric tons.” Id. at 6. Overall opium 
production in Afghanistan is expected to increase in 2007. UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, 
supra note 2, at 6.  
 78. UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 8–9 (The five most common 
reasons for cultivating opium poppy in Afghanistan in 2006 were the high sale price of opium 
(26.2%), poverty alleviation and the need to provide basic food and shelter (20.5%), lack of 
land (14.3%), the high cost of financing a family wedding (14.1%), and the absence of aid from 
the government or other sources (12.9%).). The UNODC also found that farmers in 32% of 
opium-growing villages received cash advances from drug traffickers. Id. at 9. Further, 
“[i]ntelligence reports indicate that Taliban militants are offering protection to Afghan drug 
traffickers in return for money to finance the insurgency . . . .” David S. Cloud, Rumsfeld, in 
Tajikistan, Urges Tough Stand Against Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at A10. By 
contrast, the most frequently cited reasons for not cultivating opium were a belief that opium 
cultivation is against Islam (24%), respect for decisions made by village elders (20%), 
observance of the poppy cultivation ban (18%), and fear of eradication (16%). UNODC 
FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 13. 
 79. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 8. In 2006, the weighted average 
fresh opium price was $94 per kilogram, and the dry opium price was $125 per kilogram. Id. 
The weighted average price was 8% lower than in 2005, and dry opium prices decreased by 9%. 
Id. There were significant regional differences in farm-gate prices. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 
SURVEY, supra note 3, at 90 (compares price of dry opium in each region of Afghanistan). The 
2005 price of Afghan opium was $102 per kilogram. UNODC, 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 
6. 
 80. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 8.  
 81. Id. (“Since the Afghan GDP increased by 29%, the proportion of the farm-gate value 
of opium remained stable at 11% of [the] GDP.”). 
 82. Id. (“The increase was . . . less than the increase in production (49%)—reflecting 
falling opium and heroin prices in neighboring countries as Afghan drug exports increased.”).  
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generated by opium was the equivalent of 46% of Afghanistan’s licit 
GDP ($6.7 billion in 2005–2006), and 32% of the total economy.83  
In 2006, 448,000 families were involved in opium poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan.84 The income level for households that 
produced opium was 36% greater than that of households that did not 
produce opium.85 The average opium-producing family cultivated 
0.37 hectares of opium poppy, and generated approximately $4625 
per hectare.86 This figure is nine times greater than what a family 
could have earned by raising wheat.87 
Drug addiction is a nationwide problem in Afghanistan. There are 
nearly one million drug users in the country, including 19,000 
intravenous drug users.88 Not coincidentally, as more people in 
Afghanistan have become drug users, HIV/AIDS has spread at 
alarming rates.89 
 
 83. Id. at 9 (“Given the strong growth of licit GDP, the overall size of the illicit opium 
industry in Afghanistan[] declined . . . from 61% of licit GDP in 2004 to 52% in 2005 and 46% 
of licit GDP in 2006.”). This money “is fueling government corruption, financing warlords—
some pro-government and some pro-Taliban—and adding to a dangerous disillusionment with 
President Hamid Karzai’s government.” Wrong Model for Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2007, § 4, at 15.  
 84. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 68. This reflects an increase of 
45% from 2005, when 309,000 families were involved in opium production. Id. Approximately 
three million people, or 12.6% of the total population, were involved in opium production in 
2006 (up from 11% in 2005). Id. Sixteen percent of the rural population was involved in opium 
production in 2006. Id.  
 85. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 78 (opium producers’ average 
income was $2747 in 2006, and non-opium producers’ average income was $1754). Opium-
producing households in the southern provinces had higher incomes than households in any 
other region. Id.  
 86. Id. at 91–92.  
 87. Id. (“While in 2003 a hectare under poppy cultivation would bring a farmer 27 times 
more in gross income than a hectare under wheat production, the respective ration declined to 
12 in 2004, 10 in 2005 and 9 in 2006.).  
 88. Carlotta Gall, A New Sorrow for Afghanistan: AIDS Has Joined a Growing List, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A1.  
 89. Id. (“The few surveys that exist suggest that Afghanistan has a low prevalence of 
H.I.V.—only 69 recorded cases, and just three deaths. . . . The World Health Organization has 
estimated that 1,000 to 2,000 Afghans are infected, but [a World Bank consultant on 
HIV/AIDS] said even that was ‘not even close to reality.’”).  
Geography and migration make Afghanistan particularly susceptible [to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic]. It is surrounded by countries with the fastest-growing incidence of AIDS in 
the world—Russia, China and India. Other neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, have high 
levels of drug addiction and a growing number of H.I.V. infections, as does Central 
Asia to the north . . . . AIDS can easily cross borders, carried by migrants or refugees 
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B. Implications for Regional and Global Security 
The proliferation of opium production in Afghanistan has wide-
reaching implications for regional and global security. There is a 
well-established link between narcotics and terrorism.90 In the 
abstract, the connection seems quite logical, as the U.S. State 
Department explained:  
Drug traffickers benefit from terrorists' military skills, 
weapons supply, and access to clandestine organizations. 
Terrorists gain a source of revenue and expertise in illicit 
transfer and laundering of money for their operations. Like 
traffickers and other organized crime groups, they make use of 
those countries and jurisdictions where banking regulations are 
weak. Both groups corrupt officials who can provide 
fraudulent documents, such as passports and customs papers.91 
Afghanistan is all too familiar with the link between drug 
trafficking and terrorism, as evinced by the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the United States.92  
 
who pick up drug habits or have sex with infected people in those countries and return 
home. Rates of drug addition are rising in Afghanistan, with its booming opium and 
heroin trade.  
Id. To make matters even worse, “only 30 percent of blood used in transfusions in hospitals is 
screened for H.I.V.” Id. See also Andrew North, UN Gives Afghanistan Aids Warning, BBC 
NEWS, Dec. 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4487738.stm.  
 90. See, e.g., Tamara Makarenko, The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay 
Between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism, 6.1 GLOBAL CRIME 129 (Feb. 2004); 
Melvyn Levitsky, Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security, 30 SYRACUSE 
J. INT’L L. & COM. 227 (2003); Donnie Marshall, Narco-Terrorism: The New Discovery of an 
Old Connection, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 599 (2002). 
 91. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE NEXUS BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND 
TERRORISM (Apr. 10, 2002), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/9242.htm. This link was 
illustrated by the March 11, 2004 attacks on Madrid, which were financed in part by the drug 
trade. LORENZO VIDINO, AL QAEDA IN EUROPE: THE NEW BATTLEGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL 
JIHAD 94 (2006) (citing Sebastian Rotella, Jihad’s Unlikely Alliance, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 
2004) (“According to Spanish authorities, the two hundred twenty pounds of dynamite that the 
terrorists used in the attacks were acquired in exchange for sixty-six pounds of hashish.”). The 
financier of the Madrid operation, Jamal Ahmidan, “flew to the island of Mallorca shortly 
before March 11 to arrange the sale of hashish and Ecstasy, planning to use the profits for 
additional attacks.” Id. at 324–25 (citing Rotella, supra). 
 92. Supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. However, the exact link between the 9/11 
attacks on the United States and Afghan opium production is difficult to ascertain with any 
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The drug problem in Afghanistan affects the security of all of 
Central Asia.93 The Afghan opium trade is wreaking devastating 
effects on the region.94 Specifically, heroin use is on the rise in 
Central Asia.95 Rates of HIV infection are also increasing across the 
region.96 Drugs that are transited through the area pose challenges to 
local law enforcement as organized criminal groups form and become 
more sophisticated.97 Government corruption is also becoming more 
widespread—even at high levels.98 The profitability of the drug trade 
 
precision: “The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to 
plan and conduct their attack.” 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 22, at 169. “To date, the U.S. 
government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks.” 
Id. at 172. “Al Qaeda appears to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised 
money from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers, primarily in the Gulf countries and 
particularly in Saudi Arabia.” Id. at 170. “It does not appear that any government other than the 
Taliban financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11.” Id. at 171. “While the drug trade was a 
source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda, and there is no 
reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking.” 
Id.  
 93. See, e.g., KAIRAT OSMONALIEV, DEVELOPING COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY IN 
CENTRAL ASIA: LEGAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS (Jan. 2005); Niklas Swanström, 
Multilateralism and Narcotics Control in Central Asia, CEF QUARTERLY (Feb. 2005); S. 
Frederick Starr, A Partnership for Central Asia, 84.4 FOREIGN AFF. 164 (July 1, 2005). The 
label “Central Asia” generally refers to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. 
 94. OSMONALIEV, supra note 93, at 12–25. 
 95. Id. at 15. Between 1990 and 2002, there was an eighteen-fold increase in drug 
addiction in Central Asia. Id. Hashish used to be the “drug of choice” among addicts, but “now 
opium and heroin addiction is becoming endemic, facilitated by the inflow of cheap opium and 
heroin from Afghanistan.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 16 (“70% of HIV infections across Central Asia have been contracted through 
drug injection (the figure in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is ca. 82%).”). 
 97. Id. at 17–21. See also UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 93 
(“[A]round 53% of the Afghan opiates leave . . . Afghanistan via Iran, 32% via Pakistan and 
15% via Central Asian countries.”); Tajikistan’s Presidential Election: Mountain Rigger, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2006, at 50 (“Organised crime is flourishing [in Tajikistan] thanks to in 
influx of heroin from Afghanistan.”).  
 98. CPI 2006 ranked the five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan received a score of 111; 
Kyrgyzstan, 142; Tajikistan, 142; Turkmenistan, 142; and Uzbekistan 151. CPI 2006, supra 
note 58. See also OSMONALIEV, supra note 93, at 22. Osmonaliev described a couple of high 
profile cases: “in early 2004, an officer serving as Department Head of Tajikistan’s DCA in the 
Zaravshan valley (Tajijistan) was arrested with 30 kg of heroin[]” and “[t]he Tajik ambassador 
to Kazakhstan was twice caught transporting drugs, including 62 kg of heroin, and shortly after 
his expulsion the Tajik trade representative in Kazakhstan was caught with 24 kg of heroin.” Id. 
There have also been documented cases of corrupt officials in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan. Id. at 22–23.  
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is what makes it attractive to petty criminals and high-ranking 
government officials alike.99 
III. EFFORTS TO CURB OPIUM PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN 
A. State-Building in Afghanistan  
Creating a legitimate government, while perhaps the best way to 
curb trafficking, has been the biggest challenge for Afghanistan and 
its international allies.100 Ideally, a state should have a monopoly on 
the use of force within its territory101 and it should provide basic 
services for its constituents.102 When a government fails to do these 
things, the public is bound to lose confidence and may revolt.103 In 
Afghanistan, the state and NATO forces have largely been unable to 
provide security or services to the Afghan people.104 Additionally, 
NATO forces have not always paid close enough attention to Afghan 
cultural norms or sensitivities.105 
 
 99. OSMONALIEV, supra note 93, at 23.  
 100. See e.g., Reluctant Nation Building: Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 461 (2002). 
 101. Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter & Jeremy Weinstein, Rebuilding Weak States, 
84.1 FOREIGN AFF. 134 (Jan. 1, 2005). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Afghanistan: Taking on the Taliban, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 44 (“The absence 
of enough foreign troops to provide more than a modicum of security in its stead is another 
[reason that Taliban guerillas have held onto power in parts of Afghanistan]: before 8,000 
NATO troops took charge of securing the four southern provinces on July 31st, America had 
one infantry battalion there. Afghanistan’s opium production, in which the Taliban have a stake, 
is surging too.”).  
 105. Id. (“Pushtun tribes who feel passed over for government patronage, including the 
Noorzai and Achakzai, have hired out fighters to the Taliban in Panjwayi. Virtually all Afghans 
are angered by America’s often heavy-handed tactics.”); Pushtunwali: Honour Among Them, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006, at 37.  
The search tactics of American troops in Afghanistan, five years after they invaded the 
country, tend to offend on all counts. By forcing entry into the mud-fortress home of a 
Pushtun, with its lofty buttresses and loopholes, they dishonour his property. By 
stomping through its female quarters, they dishonour his women. Worse, the search 
may end with the householder handcuffed and dragged of before his neighbours: his 
person disgraced. . . . His honour besmirched—and here’s the problem for the 
Americans—a Pushtun is obliged to have his revenge, or badal. 
Id.  
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A government that wishes to establish its legitimacy must “protect 
the basic rights and freedoms of its people, enforce the rule of law, 
and allow broad-based participation in the political process.”106 One 
article offers four lessons for “aiding, developing, and stabilizing 
failed or weak states”:  
First, money cannot buy effective governance. . . . 
Transparency—in a developing government’s decision-
making, its allocation of budgetary funds, and its 
administration of the rule of law—must also be promoted. . . . 
[Second,] Washington cannot simply avoid or wish away 
dealing with local elites, for ultimately their actions, not those 
of the United States, will strengthen or undermine 
institutions. . . . Third, in using short-term measures to resolve 
complex crises, the United States must be careful not to 
inadvertently exacerbate the situation or create new problems 
altogether. . . . Finally, U.S. policymakers must be candid 
about the long-term nature of the state-building enterprise.107  
The new government of Afghanistan has been making efforts to 
establish its legitimacy.108 This is a task that will require Afghans to 
take initiative, while also working with other states.109 Unfortunately, 
not all members of the Afghan government have been on board with 
fighting corruption.110 While many of these efforts are noble, some 
 
 106. Eizenstat, Porter & Weinstein, supra note 101, at 136. 
 107. Id. at 138–39. 
 108. Supra notes 48–54 (discussing the new Afghan Constitution, new parliament, and 
presidential elections).  
 109. Afghanistan: In Meltdown, supra note 57. NATO alone cannot tame southern 
Afghanistan, which may take decades. That is really a job for the Afghans, starting with an 
effort by Mr. Karzai to co-opt the rebellious southern tribes. Pakistan, a suspicious neighbor, 
which, at least until recently, ignored the Talibs on its turn, needs to do a lot more too. Id.  
 110. See, e.g., Rohde, supra note 11 (In 2003, the government of Helmand, Sher 
Muhammad Akhund, “confiscated 200 shops owned by a local minority group . . . . Outside the 
city, the governor doled out parcels of land to his relatives and tribe . . . . At the same time, 
reports began to circulate in Kabul that Mr. Akhnd was promoting the growth of poppy . . . .”). 
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mistakes have been made.111 For example, efforts to establish a new 
Afghan police force have not been successful.112 
B. Domestic Counter-Narcotics Strategies 
Crop eradication has been a key component of the Afghan 
Government’s efforts to curb opium poppy cultivation.113 
Government efforts have resulted in the eradication of about 13,051 
hectares of opium poppy fields.114 Overall, eradication efforts 
eliminated approximately 10% of Afghanistan’s 2006 opium crop.115 
Also, eradication has discouraged farmers from planting opium.116 
There are, however, some major downsides to crop eradication: 
“[e]radicated fields leave families in economic distress, trigger 
humanitarian disaster, and increase the temptation to join the 
insurgency.”117 Eradication must occur alongside alternative 
livelihood programs in order to be effective.118 Furthermore, 
 
 111. Eizenstat, Porter & Weinstein, supra note 101, at 139 (“Arms given to the mujahideen 
to fight the Soviets were used against American soldiers in the Afghan war following the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.”).  
 112. Rohde, supra note 11 (“[I]n 2002 and 2003, Germany, the country responsible for 
police training, dispatched only 40 advisers [to Afghanistan].”). See also James Glanz & David 
Rohde, U.S. Report Finds Dismal Training of Afghan Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A1, 
available at 2006 WLNR 20883470. (“[T]he American-trained police force in Afghanistan is 
largely incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work, and . . . . managers of the $1.1 
billion training program cannot say how many officers are actually on duty or where thousands 
of trucks and other equipment issued to police units have gone.”). 
 113. See UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 52–65. In 2006, a total of 
approximately 15,300 hectares of opium poppy fields were eradicated. Id. at 52.  
 114. Id. (“Nearly 80% of the 2006 eradication took place in four provinces: Hilmand 
(24%), Kandahar (22%), Balkh (18%), and Sari Pul (15%).”). 
 115. Id. at 52 (In 2005, eradication efforts reached just 5% of the opium cultivation area).  
 116. Id. at 55 (“The majority of the farmers (82%) who did not have any fields eradicated[] 
reported that they intended to cultivate opium poppy in 2007, while only 44% of the farmers 
who had (part of) their fields eradicated in 2006 were planning to continue.”). Eradication has 
also been detrimental to affected farmers: “When asked about the impact of eradication, 24% of 
the farmers reported that they were not able to pay back their loan and 21% said that they could 
not feed the family. Id.  
 117. UNODC, OPIUM SITUATION IN AUGUST 2005, supra note 63, at 4. 
 118. Id. The correlation between the decline in opium production and alternative livelihood 
funding cannot be overstated in “the 3 provinces where [2005]’s decline in cultivation was most 
striking  (Nangarhar –96%, Badakshan –53%,) or where cultivation remained stable (Hilmad  
–10%), are the same 3 provinces that received the largest contributions for alternative 
development (Nangarhar $70.1 million, Badakshan US $47.3 million and Hilmand US $55.7 
million).” Id. 
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eradication is not necessarily the solution because farmers are the 
“weakest link in the drug chain,” as they generally end up with just 
three or four percent of the revenue generated by the illicit drug 
trade.119 Other problems with eradication efforts include poor security 
for eradication teams and deal-making between eradication teams and 
farmers.120 
Establishing legitimate sources of income and credit is of the 
utmost importance in the fight against drugs. Hernando de Soto 
describes the need to create legitimate livelihoods through legal 
reforms: “Property . . . provides a legal alterative to drug trafficking. 
As long as the farmers remain illegal landowners, short-term cash 
crops, like coca and opium poppies, remain their only alternative.”121 
He explains:  
For small farmers in some areas of the developing world, 
money advanced by drug traffickers is practically the only 
credit available, and because their property arrangements 
appear in no official system, law enforcement cannot even find 
them, never mind work out an enforceable crop-substitution 
agreement. This lack of legal protection also means that 
growers of drug crops have to band together to defend their 
assets or call on traffickers to defend them. Without a formal 
property system that includes such landowners, controlling 
growers of drug crops, chasing drug traffickers, and identifying 
polluters of the environment becomes virtually impossible.122 
Creating legal alternatives to drug trafficking in Afghanistan will 
require continued domestic reform and international outreach efforts 
 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. UNODC OCTOBER 2006 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 64. In 2007, it appears likely that 
many farmers will cultivate opium poppy in marginal, rain-fed land in addition to the 
cultivation on the more productive, irrigated fields. If eradication teams visit their village, 
farmers can negotiate with the teams to eradicate the opium poppy in the rain-fed areas while 
leaving opium poppy in the irrigated fields alone. The farmer would suffer little economic loss 
from having these fields eradicated, and eradication teams would be able to report extensive 
eradication. Therefore, more emphasis needs to be placed on the level of standing opium poppy 
remaining after eradication as a measure of success, when assessing the effectiveness of 
Governor-led eradication programs. Id.  
 121. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 197 (2000). 
 122. Id. at 197–98.  
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directed towards farmers. Without outside assistance, many farmers 
have little choice but to turn to or stay with opium production.123 
Alternative livelihood programs are crucial because seventy percent 
of the Afghan population is dependent on agriculture.124 UNODC 
village surveys have identified three key areas for assistance: “(1) 
training in agricultural techniques and practices, (2) improved 
irrigation systems; and (3) agricultural credit schemes. Already, 
microfinance ventures have been successful among farmers in 
Afghanistan.”125 
The UNODC reported that the Government of Afghanistan is 
prosecuting traffickers.”126 Also, the Government is confronting 
corruption in Kabul and in the provinces, and it “has created a 
Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and appointed a Deputy Minister of 
 
 123. Poverty forces large numbers of Afghans to serve warlords and rely on them and not 
on themselves or the state for survival and protection. Poverty, the lack of an ability to affect 
one’s life, and insecurity for the future forces numerous Afghans to cultivate opium. Poverty 
and underemployment also fuel resentment that helps Islamic radicalism conquer new ground. 
The struggle against poverty is hence the crucial element in Afghanistan’s future and to that a 
monumental task. SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 9. See also Wrong Model for 
Afghanistan, supra note 83 (“Most of the American aid sent to Kabul since 2001 has gone into 
security programs and short-term relief and reconstruction, not the long-term development on 
which lasting security depends. This has left Afghan farmers prey to drug traffickers who often 
supply the only credit available, with repayment expected in opium poppies. And with no 
visible help coming from Kabul or Washington toward alleviating crushing poverty, people in 
Afghanistan’s southern provinces are beginning to look favorably toward a resurgent 
Taliban.”).  
 124. USAID, Asia and the Near East—Countries—Afghanistan, http://www.usaid.gov/ 
locations/asia_near_east/countries/afghanistan/ (last visited May 11, 2007). 
 125. See The Hidden Wealth of the Poor: A Survey of Microfinance, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 
2005, at 6 (microfinance ventures in Afghanistan have provided farmers with an alternative to 
poppy production, much to the chagrin of many drug lords). See also MUHAMMAD YUNUS, 
BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (1997) 
(describes the rise and success of the Grameen Bank, a microfinance institution, in 
Bangladesh).   
 126. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, SUMMARY FINDINGS OF OPIUM 
TRENDS IN AFGHANISTAN, 2005 6 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ 
afghanistan_2005/annex_opium-afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf [hereinafter UNODC, SEPTEMBER 
2005 SUMMARY] (“The Afghan Counter Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force has fast-tracked 
92 drug cases, most of them already sent to prosecutors. The Government has also assisted and 
provided evidence in support of foreign indictments of Afghan traffickers”). For a specific 
example, see Afghan Smuggler Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, at A6 (Afghanistan 
arrested a man at the central post office in Kabul who tried to mail eight pounds of heroin to 
London.).  
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Interior, charged with drug interdiction.”127 The Afghan Government 
is also planning to disarm and reintegrate militias, extradite major 
drug traffickers, and fund alternative livelihood programs.128 The 
government’s efforts will be supported by the Law and Order Trust 
Fund for Afghanistan.129 
C. U.S. Efforts to Eliminate Opium Production in Afghanistan 
The United States has been very active in Afghanistan since 2001. 
The United States and Afghanistan are parties to a number of 
multilateral and bilateral counter-narcotics agreements, including the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,130 the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances,131 and the United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.132  
The United States has traditionally withheld aid from illicit drug 
producing and drug-transit countries.133 However, the President is 
allowed to suspend this ban on aid when “a country has cooperated 
fully with the United States”134 or if “the vital national interests of the 
United States require . . .”135 assistance. Pursuant to this power, 
 
 127. UNODC, SEPTEMBER 2005 SUMMARY, supra note 126, at 6. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Press Release, UNAMA, LOTFA Received EUR 30 Million From EC; EUR 5 Million 
From Germany, and EUR 5 Million From the Netherlands (Dec. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_pr/_english/UN/2006/06dec11-UNDP-LOTFA%20press%20 
release-Eng.pdf 
 130. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, As Amended by the 1972 Protocol 
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar. 25, 1972, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf [hereinafter 1961 Convention]. See also 
“Status of Treaty Adherence [to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961],” Nov. 4 
2005, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/treaty_adherence_convention_1961.pdf. 
 131. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, Feb. 21, 1971, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf [hereinafter 1971 Convention]. See also 
“Status of Treaty Adherence [to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971],” Sept. 5, 
2005, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/treaty_adherence_convention_1971.pdf. 
 132. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988, Dec. 20, 1988, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_ 
en.pdf [hereinafter 1988 Convention]. See also “Status of Treaty Adherence [to the Convention 
against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances],” Sept. 5, 2005, 
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/treaty_adherence_convention_1988.pdf.  
 133. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j (2000). 
 134. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 135. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
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President George W. Bush cut the link between the State 
Department’s Annual Drug Trafficking Report and foreign aid to 
Afghanistan.136 The President recently requested $11.8 billion for 
operations in Afghanistan.137 He has pointed to the “remarkable 
progress” that has been made there since 2001.138 
Afghanistan allows for narcotics traffickers to be extradited to the 
United States. So far, the United States has been involved in the 
arrests and prosecutions of two major Afghan drug traffickers: Bashir 
Noorzai and Baz Mohammad. Both men were identified as drug 
traffickers by the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act 
(KDA).139 
 
 136. Joel Brinkley, Stopping Illicit Drugs Is Still Uphill Battle, Report Shows, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2005, at A4, available at WLNR 3354676. 
 137. George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on 
Terror (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/ 
20070215-1.html; Rohde, supra note 11 (“Between 2003 and 2004, American assistance to 
Afghanistan increased from $962 million to $2.4 billion; the Afghanistan staff of the United 
States aid agency doubled; and Washington dispatched an aggressive new ambassador, Zalmay 
Khalilzad.”).  
 138. Stolberg, supra note 45 (This progress includes: “A democratically elected 
government with a parliament that includes 91 women; more than five million children in 
school as opposed to 900,000 under the Taliban; and the return home of more than 4.6 million 
refugees.”).  
 139. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901–1908 (2005). The KDA seeks to “deny significant foreign 
narcotics traffickers, their related businesses, and their operatives access to the U.S. financial 
system and all trade and transactions involving U.S. companies and individuals.” WHITE 
HOUSE, FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE FOREIGN NARCOTICS KINGPIN DESIGNATION ACT 
(June 2, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050602-2.html. To date, 
the President has designated 57 Kingpins and the Department of the Treasury has announced a 
total of 116 derivative designations, 34 entities and 82 individuals, pursuant to § 805(b) of the 
Kingpin Act. These entities and individuals are subject to the same sanctions that apply to 
kingpins. In addition, designated individuals and immediate family members who have 
knowingly benefited from the designated individuals’ illicit activity will be denied visas to the 
United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C). Id. 
The Kingpin Act provides for criminal penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment for 
individuals and up to a $10 million fine for entities for violations, as well as a 
maximum of 30 years imprisonment and/or a $5 million fine for officers, directors or 
agents of entities who knowingly participate in violations. The Kingpin Act also 
provides for civil penalties of up to $1 million. 
Id. For more detailed information about the KDA, see David T. Duncan, Note, “Of Course This 
Will Hurt Business”: Foreign Standing Under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act 
of 1999 and American’s War on Drugs, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 969 (2005). 
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Noorzai was identified as a narcotics kingpin under the KDA in 
June 2004,140 and he is the first Afghan drug lord to be prosecuted on 
U.S. soil.141 He is accused of being “at the centre of a multi-million 
dollar heroin operation which controls poppy fields, drug laboratories 
and a trafficking operation based in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”142 He 
is also said to have “close links” with the Taliban and to have “used 
drug money to supply Islamic militants with arms and explosives.”143 
The Taliban, however, have denied any association with Noorzai.144 
Baz Mohammad was designated as a drug trafficker under the 
KDA on June 2, 2005.145 He was arrested by Afghan forces in 
January, 2005 at the request of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).146 On October 21, 2005 at the request of the 
U.S. Government, Mohammad was the first Afghan drug trafficker to 
be extradited from Afghanistan.147 Mohammad’s indictment alleges 
 
 140. See James Risen, An Afghan’s Path from Ally of U.S. to Drug Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 2012443.  
A native of Kandahar Province, [Noorzai] was a mujahedeen commander fighting the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. In 1990 . . . he agreed to help track 
down stinger missiles provided to the Afghan resistance by the C.I.A.; agency officials 
were worried about their possible use by terrorists. D.E.A. officials say that at the 
same time, Mr. Noorzai was a major figure in the Afghan drug trade, controlling 
poppy fields that supplied a significant share of the world’s heroin. He was also an 
early financial backer of the Taliban. Agency officials say he provided demolition 
materials, weapons and manpower in exchange for protection for his opium crops, 
heroin labs, smuggling routes and followers.  
Id. See also Paul Anderson, Drugs War Landmark in Afghanistan, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4487433.stm. 
 141. The former top counter-narcotics official at the U.S. State Department first proposed 
putting Noorzai on the kingpin list in January 2004. Risen, supra note 140. “At that time . . . no 
Afghan heroin traffickers were on the list. . . . [T]here was resistance to placing Afghans on the 
list because countering the drug trade was not an administration priority”. Id. See also 
Anderson, supra note 140.  
 142. Jeremy Cooke, US Arrests Afghan ‘Heroin Baron,’ BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4483469.stm. Additionally, “[t]he indictment says that 
[Noorzai] imported heroin to New York in the late 1990s and that unnamed co-conspirators also 
did so in 2001 and 2002.” Risen, supra note 140. 
 143. Jeremy Cooke, supra note 142. See also Risen, supra note 140. 
 144. Taleban Deny ‘Heroin Baron’ Link, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/south_asia/4486127.stm. 
 145. WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE FOREIGN NARCOTICS KINGPIN 
DESIGNATION ACT (June 2, 2005), supra note 139. 
 146. Afghan ‘Drug Lord’ Handed to US, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4373744.stm. 
 147. Id. This extradition “represents the first extradition in history from Afghanistan to the 
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that he: “led an international heroin-trafficking organization . . . 
responsible for manufacturing and distributing more than $25 million 
worth of heroin in Afghanistan and Pakistan . . . [and] arranged for 
the heroin to be imported into the United States and other countries 
and sold for tens of millions of dollars.”148 U.S. officials have 
heralded the extradition and indictment.149 Mohammad pleaded guilty 
to the charges on July 11, 2006.150 
Additionally, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development have been very active in promoting 
“alternative livelihood” programs for Afghan farmers.151  
IV. HOW TO COUNTER ILLICIT OPIUM PRODUCTION MORE 
EFFECTIVELY 
President Karzai has criticized the international community for 
failing to provide adequate financial support in Afghanistan’s war 
 
United States.” Press Release, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, United 
States Announces Historic Extradition of Taliban-Linked Afghan Narco-Terrorist to New York 
(Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/October%2005/ 
Baz%20Mohammad%20Extradition%20PR.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Att’y Press Release]. 
 148. U.S. Att’y Press Release, supra note 147.  
 149. Michael J. Garcia, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
said that the extradition meant that “Afghanistan will no longer be a safe haven for 
narcotraffickers like Baz Mohammed.” Id. Karen P. Tandy, the Administrator of the DEA 
reiterated Garcia’s sentiment. Id. And, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez issued his own 
statement: “This first-ever extradition from Afghanistan sends a clear message to drug lords 
around the word: Those who seek to destroy American lives will be brought to justice.” Press 
Release, Statement of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales on the Extradition of Baz 
Mohammad (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_ag_ 
562.html. 
 150. Metro Briefing New York: Manhattan: Afghan Drug Kingpin Pleads Guilty, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 2006, at B7. 
 151. See generally USAID, Asia and the Near East—Countries—Afghanistan, supra note 
124. For examples of specific initiatives, see generally USAID, 1 Alternative Development 
Update (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/ 
weeklyreports/USAID_AD_Update_Feb_07.pdf (contains several examples of current 
alternative livelihoods projects); see also Press Release, USAID, $218.6 Million Contract 
Awarded to Bolster Afghanistan’s Public, Private Sectors (Mar. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2007/pr070313.html; Press Release, USAID, USAID 
Awards $1.4 Billion Contract for Infrastructure in Afghanistan (Sept. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2006/pr060922.html. The Department of State is also 
involved in the “Businesses Building Businesses” initiative, which is intended to improve the 
Afghan business climate. See generally State Dep’t, Businesses Building Businesses for 
Afghanistan, http://www.state.gov/e/bbb/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).  
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against drugs.152 Yet, it will take more than money for Afghanistan to 
eradicate illicit drug production. If the United States and other 
nations truly wish to be instrumental in helping Afghanistan make the 
transition to democracy, they will have to continue to take a multi-
pronged approach.153 The war on Afghan opium production can be 
divided into three fronts: continuing state-building, reforming 
farmers, and punishing traffickers. 
A. Continuing State-Building 
If Afghanistan is ever going to survive as a democratic nation, it 
will need to have a sturdy legal and political foundation.154 
Unfortunately, state-building in Afghanistan has been difficult 
because some question the new Afghan state’s foundation.155 In order 
to create legitimate legal and political systems, the new Afghan 
government must enact laws that reflect existing social norms.156 
Additionally, Afghan leaders must continue to work hard to protect 
 
 152. Steven R. Weisman, On Visit to U.S., Afghan Leader Defends Opium Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 2005, at A10.  
 153. Eizenstat, Porter & Weinstein, supra note 101 (“A comprehensive state-building 
strategy must rely on the entire range of tools in Washington’s foreign policy arsenal, including 
trade policy, debt relief, security assistance, and diplomacy.”). 
 154. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.  
 155. See e.g., Christian Ahlund, Major Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in a Post-
Conflict Environment, 39 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 39, 41 (2004) (“The Bonn Agreement reflects 
what could be agreed upon by the various ethnic and political forces in the country, including 
several powerful warlords with blood on their hands and little or no commitment to democracy 
and rule of law.”).  
 156. DE Soto, supra note 121, at 171–81. De Soto explains:  
Outside the West, extralegal social contracts prevail for a good reason: They have 
managed much better than formal law to build on the actual consensus between people 
about how their assets ought to be governed. Any attempt to create a unified property 
system that does not take into account the collective contracts that underpin existing 
property arrangements will crash into the very roots of the rights most people rely on 
for holding onto their assets. Efforts to reform property rights fail because officials in 
charge of drafting new legal rules do not realize that most of their citizens have firmly 
established their own rules by social contract. 
Id. at 172. Western property laws have succeeded because they have incorporated widespread 
extralegal arrangements. Id. at 174–75. “Extralegal social contracts rely on a combination of 
customs, ad hoc improvisations, and rules selectively borrowed from the official legal system.” 
Id. at 175–76. “[I]t is extralegal law that regulates the assets of most citizens.” Id. at 176. Asset 
owners in the extralegal sector are “‘law-abiding,’ although the laws they abide by are not the 
government’s.” Id. at 179. 
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the basic rights and freedoms of the Afghan people.157 They must also 
make the Afghan government transparent and incorporate local 
elites.158 The United States can help the situation by avoiding quick-
fixes to immediate issues that will ultimately lead to long-term 
problems.159 Specifically, the United States should continue to 
provide the Afghan government with political160 and financial 
support.161 The United States and its allies will have to continue to 
use force until democracy is well entrenched in Afghanistan.162 
Indeed, it is in the best security interests of the United States and 
other states.163 
B. Reaching Out to Farmers  
Afghan farmers need viable alternatives to opium production. This 
can be accomplished by improving infrastructure, providing security 
in Afghan villages, and by increasing opportunities for legal 
employment.164  
 
 157. See supra note 106. 
 158. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 159. Id. The CIA’s decision to ignore Afghan opium production during the Cold War is an 
example of such a problematic policy. See, e.g., supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 160. See supra note 47. 
 161. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 162. Ahlund, supra note 155, at 41–44. Ahlund argues: “Any improvement in the situation 
would require the national government to be able to project its power and authority beyond 
Kabul. This will not happen until the international community provides ISAF with enough 
muscle to make its presence felt in the whole country.” Id. at 41. He said, “legitimacy and the 
authority of the governing structure—and its activities in building the rule of law—will, from 
the beginning, need to be backed up and protected by sufficient force.” Id. at 44. Finally, he 
said, “The only structure capable of providing the necessary leadership and legitimacy 
necessary for such an operation is the U.N., but the resources for ensuring authority and 
security [in Afghanistan] must come from individual states.” Id.  
 163. See supra Part II.B. Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein argue that “recent U.S.-lead 
endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the planning, financing, 
coordination, and execution of U.S. programs for rebuilding war-torn states are woefully 
inadequate.” Eizenstat, Porter & Weinstein, supra note 101, at 134. They note also that “there is 
a crisis of governance in a large number of weak, impoverished states, and this crisis poses a 
serious threat to U.S. national security.” Id. Today, they say, “the gravest danger to [the U.S.] 
lies in the weakness of other countries—the kind of weakness that has allowed opium 
production to skyrocket in Afghanistan, the small arms trade to flourish throughout Central 
Asia, and al Qaeda to exploit Somalia and Pakistan as staging grounds for attacks.” Id. They 
argue that “state building is not an act of simple charity but a smart investment in the United 
States’ own safety and stability.” Id. at 135. 
 164. SWANSTRÖM & CORNELL, supra note 12, at 9. 
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Continued investment in rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure is 
essential.165 Afghanistan cannot survive without adequate 
transportation networks.166 Specific efforts should include completing 
the highway between Kabul and Kandahar167 and improving air 
travel.168 Such efforts will result in more mobility and more 
opportunities for Afghan farmers, which should, in turn, reduce 
reliance on opium cultivation.169 
The security situation needs to be improved in Afghan villages. 
There is a correlation between areas where security is “poor” and 
where opium is produced.170 Thus, in the southern provinces, the 
United States and its allies should continue to assist the Afghan 
people in fighting the Taliban insurgency.171 Specifically, ISAF 
should continue to send troops, and it should increase its forces in the 
most problematic parts of Afghanistan.172 Additionally, the United 
States should continue to provide funding and training for the Afghan 
police force.173 
The United States should help the Afghan government create 
opportunities for farmers to obtain legitimate employment, because 
the main reasons farmers decide to cultivate opium is to earn 
money.174 Ideally, improved infrastructure and security will 
automatically lead to more opportunities for Afghan farmers. 
 
 165. See id. (“Afghanistan’s biggest problem today is the destruction of its physical 
infrastructure as well as of its societal makeup.”). The key to long-term survival is “to resurrect 
Afghanistan’s role as a trading nation on the crossroads of great civilizations, something that 
development cooperation can best contribute to through investments in infrastructure.” Id.  
 166. Id. (Such investments are important because “[l]ack of infrastructure for 
communication and transportation increases parochialism, prevents travel and the exchange of 
ideas and goods between the provinces of Afghanistan, and hence contributes to suspicion and 
hostility among the diverse ethnocultural groups of the country.”). 
 167. STATE DEP’T BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 13; supra note 60. 
 168. See supra note 60. 
 169. See supra note 78 (listing reasons people decide whether or not to cultivate opium). 
 170. UNODC FEBRUARY 2007 SURVEY, supra note 2, at 13 (“The survey indicates that 
approximately 79 per cent of villages with poor security and 63 per cent of villages with very 
poor security are involved in poppy cultivation, as compared to only 22 per cent of villages with 
good security.”). See also supra note 76. 
 171. See supra note 57. 
 172. See, e.g., supra note 158. 
 173. The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, supra note 129, is an excellent start. 
Historically, however, the international community’s efforts to develop the police have not been 
successful; see supra note 112.  
 174. See supra note 78. 
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However, the United States can bolster the availability of such 
opportunities by continuing to fund alternative livelihood 
programs.175 
C. Defeating Drug Traffickers 
The United States also needs to place more emphasis on helping 
the Afghan government catch and punish drug traffickers. 
Specifically, the United States should continue to send troops to 
Afghanistan,176 and it should continue to address the difficulties in 
developing a police force to pursue traffickers.177 Additionally, the 
Afghan government should continue to extradite major drug 
traffickers to third countries.178 This will reiterate the message that 
opium trafficking will not be tolerated in Afghanistan.179 Finally, the 
United States must help Afghanistan write and enforce tough anti-
trafficking legislation.180 
V. CONCLUSION 
Effectively countering the proliferation of narcotics in 
Afghanistan is not an easy task by any stretch of the imagination. It is 
necessary, however, for Afghanistan to develop as a democratic state 
and for the security of nations around the world. Afghan and 
international actors need to focus on reforming farmers while 
punishing drug traffickers. Specifically, the United States must 
continue to help Afghanistan engage in state-building activities, reach 
out to farmers, and punish traffickers.  
The United States should continue to support Afghanistan’s 
efforts by providing funding and manpower. In addition to donating 
resources, the United States can help Afghanistan by extraditing and 
prosecuting Afghan drug lords. Also, states should support 
Afghanistan’s growing legitimate economy through investment and 
 
 175. See supra notes 123–24, 151 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 158. 
 177. See supra notes 112 and 129. 
 178. See supra notes 139–50. 
 179. See supra note 149. 
 180. See supra notes 126–29. 
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trade. If Afghanistan and international actors fail to act, Afghanistan 
could collapse into chaos—providing a safe haven for terrorism, 
organized crime, and the worldwide proliferation of illicit narcotics. 
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